

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING IN COUNTERING  
TERRORISM ON GLOBAL, NATIONAL, LOCAL, & CYBER FRONTS

by  
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## **Abstract**

Research on intelligence led policing in general is lacking within academia but, it is extremely lacking in reference to intelligence led policing as a method to countering terrorism. There is also a lack of standardization for a uniform definition of intelligence led policing. This research seeks to begin to fill in the gaps in the research on intelligence led policing in academia but, acknowledges that further research will need to be completed on this topic in the future. This research aims to determine if intelligence led policing is an effective method for countering terrorism on local, national, and global levels, as well as on the new frontier on the internet. The methodology of this research utilizes data from the Global Terrorism Database and New America Foundation to compare incidences of terrorism before the implementation of intelligence led policing versus after its implementation. Data was also utilized from New America Foundation to compare the radicalization of jihadists online. This research found that while intelligence led policing may be an effective method to counter terrorism on its own, there are probably more significant variables that impact the method's effectiveness than simply its implementation by law enforcement, such as manpower, budget, and federal government involvement. Further research is needed to determine if these variables, among others, may be more significant in determining the effectiveness of intelligence led policing as a counter terrorism method.

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## **Introduction**

I have served as a local law enforcement officer in the United States for approximately two years. From the time I was in the academy throughout my career in law enforcement, the buzzword in policing has been intelligence led policing. Many agencies, the agency I currently work for included, have policies in place to implement intelligence led policing but, do not have the manpower, funding, or training in place to implement such policies. This paper examines whether intelligence led policing is an effective model to combat terrorism on the local, national, and global levels, as well as on the new frontier on the internet. What can be learned from this paper is whether intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism method and solutions for how it can be utilized on all levels in the global fight against terror.

## **Literature Review**

### **Policing**

In his book, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*, Wilson categorized four types on law enforcement response: police invoked law enforcement, citizen invoked law enforcement, police invoked order maintenance, and citizen invoked order maintenance<sup>1</sup>. Wilson defines police invoked law enforcement as being when law enforcement initiate actions themselves; citizen invoked law enforcement as being when a citizen makes a crime complaint to initiate law enforcement action; police invoked order maintenance as being when law enforcement initiates actions to prevent public disorder themselves; and citizen invoked order maintenance as being when a citizen makes a complaint for public or private

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<sup>1</sup> Wilson, James. 1978. *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*.

disorder<sup>2</sup>. The differences in these four types lie in criminality and who initiated action by law enforcement officers. Law enforcement complaints typically involve calls such as burglaries, car breaks, arrests, etc. while disorder complaints typically involve calls such as disturbances, investigations, family or neighborhood trouble etc<sup>3</sup>. Another term for police invoked actions would be proactive policing, while another term for citizen invoked actions would be reactionary policing.

Whether proactive or reactionary, methods that focus primarily on law enforcement and maintaining order are viewed as more “traditional” policing methods. This contrasts with newer policing methods such as community-oriented policing or intelligence led policing that emphasize partnerships between the community and law enforcement. Community oriented policing relies heavily on the relationship developed between law enforcement and the communities they serve. It emphasizes the use of this relationship by law enforcement to proactively solve crimes and address issues in the community. It is believed that by building a positive relationship with the community, citizens are more likely to work with and offer information to law enforcement to reduce crime rates. Intelligence led policing is a policing method that was developed in the United Kingdom and widely adopted by local law enforcement agencies in the United States following the attacks on 9/11. Intelligence led policing is the utilization of intelligence to analyze trends in the community’s local law enforcement agencies serve in order to reduce crime. While intelligence led policing is used for a variety of crimes, there is a strong homeland security element that emphasizes utilization of police intelligence to identify possible radicalized threats. However, reactionary policing is what it sounds like, police

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

reacting to calls for service or events in their area of responsibility. While this can make up a large portion of police work, it is the least favorable policing method because there is a lack of proactivity. Without proactivity and creating relationships with the community, such as those utilized in community oriented policing and intelligence led policing, it becomes more difficult to solve crimes in general.

Community oriented policing relies heavily on the relationship between local law enforcement agencies and their local communities. As one could imagine, in many communities, this relationship is particularly strained. Many members of the community not only have a poor working relationship with local law enforcement agencies, but they fear retribution from other members of their community as well – such as gangs and other prominent groups<sup>4</sup>.

It should be noted that community oriented policing faces similar criticisms as intelligence led policing. Community oriented policing is similarly vague and even more difficult to measure<sup>5</sup>. Community oriented policing also does not have a national standard for its implementation, which allows the local law enforcement agencies that implement it to implement it to varying degrees<sup>6</sup>. It should also be noted that there has been limited empirical research on the effectiveness of community oriented policing for these reasons<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, there has been limited to no empirical research conducted on the effectiveness of community oriented policing as a counter terrorism method<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Lieberman, Charles Andrew. 2009. "Community Policing & Counter Terrorism: Community Policing Philosophy as a Tool for Local Law Enforcement to Counter Terrorist Activities." *ProQuest*.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

A focus group study found there was both community and law enforcement agency support for community oriented policing as a counter terrorism method<sup>9</sup>. However, this study did not provide a comparison of community oriented policing and intelligence led policing to the focus group. The study also did not measure the attitudes of the participants on intelligence led policing as a counter terrorism method in order to compare levels of support.

Community oriented policing relies too heavily on the relationship between local law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Community oriented policing also faces the issue of overemphasizing the desires of the community being served. In some cases, residents are even being asked to tell law enforcement how to prioritize certain issues in their community, such as in the neighborhood policing variant of community oriented policing in the United Kingdom<sup>10</sup>. Taking into consideration that community oriented policing is a more decentralized law enforcement method compared to a centralized method, such as intelligence led policing, this makes it difficult to implement as a counter terrorism method and unreliable.

That being said, both community oriented policing and intelligence led policing are both preferable to reactionary policing. Reactionary policing is when police wait to react for calls for service instead of proactively making connections with the communities they serve. This entails random motorized patrols and limited interaction with the local community<sup>11</sup>. This is in a stark contrast to both the community oriented policing and intelligence led policing methods. As demonstrated by rising crime rates throughout the Five Eyes Community, reactionary policing is

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Bullock, Karen. 2013. "Community, intelligence-led policing and crime control." *Policing and Society* 23:2 125-144.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.



ineffective<sup>12</sup>. While local law enforcement agencies still react to call for service, this alone is not enough to prevent crimes or terrorism from occurring.

### **Proponents of Intelligence Led Policing**

Academia generally views intelligence led policing as being an effective policing method, even when used to counter terrorism. In fact, many believe it is the natural method to counter terrorism on the home front<sup>13</sup>. However, while it may seem as the natural method, smaller agencies tend to lack the resources to effectively implement intelligence led policing. The implementation of intelligence led policing and distribution of resources are primarily decisions made on the administration level of law enforcement agencies. Carter, Phillips, and Gayadeen indicated that agency size is unrelated to decision making<sup>14</sup>. In loose coupling theory, it is believed that organizations are split into superordinate and subordinate levels in which the superordinate level is comprised of supervisors who “maintain institutional legitimacy”, while the subordinate level is comprised of “institutional actors” who follow the superordinate’s “prescription” for the agency<sup>15</sup>. Even though both of these levels are linked, they still maintain some level of autonomy from the other<sup>16</sup>. Through the use of loose coupling theory, they determined that either all law enforcement agencies in the United States utilize intelligence when making decisions, or none of them do<sup>17</sup>.

### **Criticisms of Intelligence Led policing**

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<sup>12</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. “Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice.” *Policing and Society* 12:1 53-66.

<sup>13</sup> Weaver, Sue Diane. 2014. “Thinking Outside the Box: Melding Community Policing with Homeland Security Law Operations.” *Journal of Law Enforcement* 4: 1-7

<sup>14</sup> Carter, Jeremy G., Scott W. Phillips, and S. Marlon Gayadeen. 2014. “Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: An Application of Loose-Coupling Theory.” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 42: 433-442

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

The status quo in academia on the topic of intelligence led policing seems to be that it is a largely effective policing method. However, many note that there is no true definition of intelligence led policing, or that the definitions of intelligence led policing are far too vague to be accurately measured<sup>18 19 20</sup>. It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely limited data on intelligence led policing in general, even before consideration of the policing method being applied to counter terrorism<sup>21 22 23 24</sup>. Thus, it appears that there is not any evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing generally, or to counter terrorism<sup>25</sup>.

Another major criticism of intelligence led policing in the United States is that it is resource intensive. The majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States do not have the staff or resources available to implement intelligence led policing<sup>26 27</sup>. It has also been shown that it is difficult for smaller law enforcement agencies to establish an intelligence liaison

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<sup>18</sup> Alach, Zhivan. 2011. "The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth." *The Police Journal* 84: 75-97

<sup>19</sup> Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. "Modelling intelligence-led policing to identify its potential." *European Journal of Policing Studies* 1:171-191

<sup>20</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260

<sup>21</sup> Carter, Jeremy G., Scott W. Phillips, and S. Marlon Gayadeen. 2014. "Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: An Application of Loose-Coupling Theory." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 42: 433-442

<sup>22</sup> Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. "Modelling intelligence-led policing to identify its potential." *European Journal of Policing Studies* 1:171-191

<sup>23</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

<sup>24</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158

<sup>25</sup> Alach, Zhivan. 2011. "The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth." *The Police Journal* 84: 75-97

<sup>26</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>27</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

officer, much less a dedicated intelligence unit, due to the lack of funding available<sup>28</sup>. The federal government may need to provide resources and training to local law enforcement agencies in order to make the nationwide implementation of intelligence led policing possible<sup>29</sup>. It should also be noted, however, that the issues of lack of training and understanding were echoed by other Five Eyes partners with more centralized law enforcement structures, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom<sup>30 31</sup>. As pointed out by Ratcliffe as well, is that the members of the Five Eyes Community also suffer from a lack of commonality between their technologies, which prevents the standardization of the intelligence led policing method both within and between states<sup>32</sup>.

Furthermore, a single, nationwide, standard has not been set for the implementation of intelligence led policing in the United States<sup>33</sup>. The Bush administration did set forth minimum national training requirements following 9/11, such as learning the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System<sup>34</sup>. Once again, however, it was found that even though most local law enforcement agencies had an emergency response plan, many still did not have intelligence officers – nor did they intend to hire any in the future<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158

<sup>29</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>30</sup> Burcher, Morgan and Chad Whelan. 2019. "Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence Analysts." *Police Quarterly* 22:2 139-160.

<sup>31</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. "The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study." *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

<sup>32</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. "Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice." *Policing and Society* 12:1 53-66.

<sup>33</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

<sup>34</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Other key criticisms of intelligence led policing are the increased potential for biased based policing and the overshadowing of other serious crimes. The main criticism of intelligence led policing and the potential for biased policing stems from civil rights issues<sup>36</sup>. It is argued that law enforcement agencies are faced with the difficult challenge of both implementing intelligence led policing and not infringing upon the constitutional rights of American citizens<sup>37</sup>. The main criticism of intelligence led policing overshadowing of other serious crimes is that when intelligence led policing is focused on terrorism, this focus overshadows all other serious crimes<sup>38</sup>. It is believed that if the intelligence led policing model focused on all serious crimes in general, the life support for terror attacks would be cut off due to lack of resources available for the counter terrorism effort<sup>39</sup>. It should be noted that both Jackson and Prunckun believe that once these two criticisms have been overcome, intelligence led policing would be effective<sup>40 41</sup>. It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely limited data on intelligence led policing in general, even before consideration of the policing method being applied to counter

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<sup>36</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. "Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129

<sup>37</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. "Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129

<sup>38</sup> Prunckun, Henry. 2016. "The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism's Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law Enforcement Concern." *Salus Journal* 4: 62-81

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. "Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129

<sup>41</sup> Prunckun, Henry. 2016. "The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism's Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law Enforcement Concern." *Salus Journal* 4: 62-81

terrorism<sup>42 43 44 45</sup>. In the Five Eyes Community, it appears that the only state that has documented their intelligence led policing is the United Kingdom, making it difficult to measure the effectiveness of intelligence led policing in the Five Eyes member states<sup>46</sup>. Thus, it appears that there is not any evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing generally, or to counter terrorism<sup>47</sup>.

### **Intelligence Led Policing and Homegrown Terrorism**

When implementing the intelligence led policing model, local law enforcement agencies stress the importance of the relationship between the community and law enforcement officers<sup>48</sup>. Some believe that this relationship is the key to combatting homegrown terrorism in the United States<sup>49</sup>. In the United States, where domestic terrorist attacks outnumber international terrorist attacks by a ratio of 7-to-1, intelligence led policing should be effective in countering homegrown terrorism<sup>50</sup>. This same community involvement, however, has been criticized for inhibiting the intelligence led policing method from being implemented due to the community and law enforcement agency disconnect<sup>51</sup>. This relationship makes it difficult to separate the

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<sup>42</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357.

<sup>43</sup> Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. "Modelling intelligence-led policing to identify its potential." *European Journal of Policing Studies* 1:171-191.

<sup>44</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283.

<sup>45</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158.

<sup>46</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. "The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study." *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

<sup>47</sup> Alach, Zhivan. 2011. "The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth." *The Police Journal* 84: 75-97.

<sup>48</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and David L. Carter. 2012. "Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized terrorism." *Police Practice and Research* 13: 138-154

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158

<sup>51</sup> Osborn, Brandon. 2018. "Crime Prevention: Methods to Improve Intelligence-Led Policing." ProQuest 1-220

needs and wants of the community from those of the law enforcement agency<sup>52</sup>. It is believed this could be overcome by keeping the community informed on the utilization of intelligence in the decision making processes of the law enforcement agency<sup>53</sup>.

### **Intelligence Led Policing and Fusion Centers**

The purpose of fusion centers after 9/11 was to provide transparency and ease communications between agencies that have intelligence information. However, restricting intelligence operations only out of fusion centers limits the ability of agencies to gather and share intelligence<sup>54</sup>. In their research on intelligence led policing, Telep, Ready, and Bottema revealed that fusion centers ultimately benefit law enforcement agencies by creating a framework for intelligence sharing between different agencies<sup>55</sup>. Unfortunately, law enforcement officers rarely receive intelligence from the fusion centers, even though patrol officers would benefit the most from the information<sup>56</sup>. Furthermore, the same patrol officers who would benefit the most from this information often lack training on how to contact the fusion center to access, or distribute information, as well as how to use the intelligence received from the fusion center on the road. The utilization of these fusion centers was designed to allow agencies that have limited resources to implement intelligence led policing effectively<sup>57</sup>. Instead, local law enforcement agencies are some of the least likely to utilize fusion centers. In fact, federal agencies are more than eight times more likely than other law enforcement agencies to utilize fusion centers<sup>58</sup>. Another key issue with the emphasis on the utilization of fusion centers is that they tend to be located and

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. "Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The Phoenix Police Department Intelligence Officer Program." Oxford University Press 12: 332-343

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Lewandowski, Carla, Jeremy G. Carter, and Walter L. Campbell. 2017. "The Utility of Fusion Centers to Enhance Intelligence-Led Policing: An Exploration of End-Users." Oxford University Press 12: 177-193

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

focused on major urban areas. As such, local law enforcement agencies that are located in urban areas are more likely to utilize fusion centers than those located in rural areas<sup>59</sup>. While this certainly offers potential benefits to urban areas like New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Chicago, and Orlando – agencies which are discussed later in this paper – it allows rural agencies to slip through the cracks. This is especially problematic when rural law enforcement agencies already have limited or no capacity to implement intelligence led policing due to a lack of manpower, funds, training, and resources<sup>60 61 62 63</sup>.

A model that may be more effective than the use of fusion centers is the one that was implemented by the Phoenix Police Department. The Phoenix Police Department chose six patrol officers on shift in its Mountain View Precinct to train as intelligence officers<sup>64</sup>. These new intelligence officers on patrol were then able to go to active calls to distribute intelligence from the responding officers on scene or collect intelligence from them to distribute to the rest of the department, as well as agencies at the local, state, and federal levels<sup>65</sup>. This program showed high levels of support from its agency, but its effectiveness in reducing crime rates or countering terrorism were not measured<sup>66</sup>. This model is more cost effective as law enforcement agencies would only have to select a few members of their agency to become dually trained, instead of hiring sworn law enforcement officers and non-sworn civilians as analysts. This method is likely

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>61</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

<sup>62</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158

<sup>63</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260

<sup>64</sup> Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. "Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The Phoenix Police Department Intelligence Officer Program." *Oxford University Press* 12: 332-343

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

to be more effective in the overall implementation of intelligence led policing as it eliminates the disconnect between patrol officers and fusion centers. Although, it should be noted that research has not yet been conducted on a comparative level between The Phoenix Police Department model and the Fusion Center model. This is a topic that should be explored by future research.

### **Intelligence Led Policing in the Five Eyes Community**

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the intelligence led policing model was widely accepted by local law enforcement agencies across the United States. As such, the United States' Department of Justice endorsed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, which calls on all United States law enforcement agencies – federal, state, and local – to develop and implement an intelligence led policing framework<sup>67</sup>. However, intelligence led policing has been implemented throughout the Five Eyes Community over the course of differing time periods. For example, intelligence led policing began in the United Kingdom prior to 9/11 and like the United States, it has developed the National Intelligence Model, promoting intelligence led policing<sup>68 69</sup>. The difference between the United States' and the United Kingdom's models is that the United Kingdom requires by law that law enforcement agencies in their country will implement the National Intelligence Model<sup>70</sup>. Within the Five Eyes Community, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States all implement intelligence led policing

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<sup>67</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. "The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study." *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.



within their law enforcement agencies<sup>71 72</sup>. Canada has even been at the forefront of intelligence led policing with the use of GIS systems to support their local law enforcement's intelligence capacity, such as with their Waterloo Region Police Service and the Vancouver Police Department<sup>73</sup>. This allows Canada to proactively analyze and prevent crime, a concept that may spread to other Five Eyes partners<sup>74</sup>.

### **Criticisms of Intelligence Led policing**

While academia seems to generally agree that intelligence led policing seems to be a largely effective policing method, many note that there is no true definition of intelligence led policing, or that the definitions of intelligence led policing are far too vague to be measured<sup>75 76</sup>. It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely limited data on intelligence led policing in general, even before consideration of the policing method being applied to counter terrorism<sup>78 79 80 81</sup>. In the Five Eyes Community, it appears that the only state that has documented their intelligence led policing is the United Kingdom, making it difficult to measure

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<sup>71</sup> Burcher, Morgan and Chad Whelan. 2019. "Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence Analysts." *Police Quarterly* 22:2 139-160.

<sup>72</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. "The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study." *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

<sup>73</sup> Herchenrader, Tegan and Steven Myhill-Jones. 2015. "GIS supporting intelligence-led policing." *Police Practice and Research* 16:2 136-147.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Alach, Zhivan. 2011. "The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth." *The Police Journal* 84: 75-97.

<sup>76</sup> Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. "Modelling intelligence-led policing to identify its potential." *European Journal of Policing Studies* 1:171-191

<sup>77</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260.

<sup>78</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357.

<sup>79</sup> Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. "Modelling intelligence-led policing to identify its potential." *European Journal of Policing Studies* 1:171-191.

<sup>80</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283.

<sup>81</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158.

the effectiveness of intelligence led policing in the Five Eyes member states<sup>82</sup>. Thus, it appears that there is not any evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing generally, or to counter terrorism<sup>83</sup>.

Another major criticism of intelligence led policing in the United States is that it is very resource intensive. The majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States do not have the staff or resources available to implement intelligence led policing<sup>84 85</sup>. It has also been shown that it is difficult for smaller law enforcement agencies to establish an intelligence liaison officer, much less a dedicated intelligence unit, due to the lack of funding available<sup>86</sup>. As such, many local law enforcement agencies in the United States view the implementation of intelligence led policing as an “unfunded mandate” by the federal government<sup>87</sup>. The federal government may need to provide resources and training to local law enforcement agencies in order to make the nationwide implementation of intelligence led policing more possible<sup>88</sup>. It should be noted, however, that the issues of lack of training and understanding were echoed by other Five Eyes partners with more centralized law enforcement structures, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom<sup>89 90</sup>. As pointed out by Ratcliffe as well, is that the members of the Five

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<sup>82</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

<sup>83</sup> Alach, Zhivan. 2011. “The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense as Transcendental Truth.” *The Police Journal* 84: 75-97.

<sup>84</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA.” *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357.

<sup>85</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat.” *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283.

<sup>86</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism.” *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA.” *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357.

<sup>89</sup> Burcher, Morgan and Chad Whelan. 2019. “Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence Analysts.” *Police Quarterly* 22:2 139-160.

<sup>90</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” *Police Practice and Research* 6:5 435-451.

Eyes Community also suffer from a lack of commonality between their technologies, which prevents the standardization of the intelligence led policing method both within and between states<sup>91</sup>.

Furthermore, a single, nationwide, standard has not been set for the implementation of intelligence led policing in the United States, nor in other Five Eyes member states<sup>92 93</sup>. The Bush administration did set forth minimum national training requirements following 9/11, such as learning the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System<sup>94</sup>. Once again, however, it was found that even though most local law enforcement agencies had an emergency response plan, many still did not have intelligence officers – nor did they intend to hire any in the future<sup>95</sup>.

Other key criticisms of intelligence led policing are the increased potential for biased based policing and the overshadowing of other serious crimes. The main criticism of intelligence led policing and the potential for biased based policing stems from civil rights issues<sup>96</sup>. It is argued that law enforcement agencies are faced with the difficult challenge of both implementing intelligence led policing and not infringing upon the civil rights of citizens<sup>97</sup>. It should be noted

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<sup>91</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. "Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice." *Policing and Society* 12:1 53-66.

<sup>92</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283.

<sup>93</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. "Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice." *Policing and Society* 12:1 53-66.

<sup>94</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. "Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

that both Jackson and Prunckun believe that once potential civil rights violations have been overcome, intelligence led policing would be effective<sup>98 99</sup>.

### **Types of Social Media Platforms Utilized by the Islamic State**

The Islamic State's internet mujahideen seeks to fulfill their electronic jihad on both centralized and decentralized social media platforms<sup>100</sup>. The majority of Western citizens are aware of their utilization of centralized social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and lesser known Telegram, where the group was well known for posting gory propaganda videos and engaging in hashtag hijacking to promote their cause<sup>101</sup>. However, the Islamic State is also active on less popular websites, that are generally unknown to the Western public, such as RocketChat and ZeroNet that operate on decentralized data stores<sup>102</sup>. The difference between centralized and decentralized social media platforms is simple in that the developers of decentralized social media platforms lack the ability to act against content that is stored on servers operated by their users or that are distributed amongst their user community<sup>103</sup>. In contrast, social media platforms with centralized data stores can take action against such content, as frequently observed by their users when platforms remove social media posts or ban user accounts for content<sup>104</sup>. The downfall of the utilization of decentralized social media platforms by the internet mujahideen is that their content can only reach people who have

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<sup>98</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. "Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129.

<sup>99</sup> Prunckun, Henry. 2016. "The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism's Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law Enforcement Concern." *Salus Journal* 4: 62-81.

<sup>100</sup> Rudner, Martin. 2017. "'Electronic Jihad': The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40:1 10-23.

<sup>101</sup> Harley, Nicky. 2019. "ISIS is using new social media sites after Facebook and Twitter crackdown." *The National*.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

registered to the platform it is distributed on, therefore their content fails to reach a wide base of public viewership from target populations such as those in the West<sup>105</sup>.

Telegram is uniquely favored among platforms that utilize centralized data stores due to its implementation of end-to-end data encryption of its users' chat conversations<sup>106</sup>. This feature has led to the Islamic State favoring Telegram to distribute "official" content and plan terrorist attacks<sup>107</sup>. However, Telegram possesses a pitfall similar to decentralized social media platforms in that many groups require users to be invited to their chats in order to view content<sup>108</sup>. As such, leadership from the Islamic State has discouraged ISIS members from isolating themselves on platforms like Telegram due to the lack of public viewership they provide.

However, even though a hallmark characteristic of ISIS is their utilization of social media to distribute propaganda, in 2017, Islamic State leadership issued a decree that banned its members from utilizing social media platforms to disseminate information and recruit due to mounting paranoia over infiltration and tracking by foreign intelligence agencies on the internet<sup>109</sup>. Although such a decree demonstrates their suspicion of Western governments, it does not appear to have been effective in preventing users from posting content in pursuit of "electronic jihad".

### **Consumers of Islamic State Propaganda on Social Media Platforms**

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Prucha, Nico. 2016. "IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10:6 48-58.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Dearden, Lizzie. 2017. "Isis bans fighters from using social media amid paranoia over spying and dissent." *The Independent*.

Between October and November of 2014 alone, there were approximately 46,000 Twitter accounts that supported the Islamic State<sup>110</sup>. The ISIS Twitter Census utilized open source research to geo-locate ISIS supporting Twitter accounts<sup>111</sup>. It should be noted that this data only takes into consideration Twitter user accounts that are location enabled<sup>112</sup>. Therefore, the total number of Twitter accounts that supported the Islamic State during this period it likely larger in various geographic areas<sup>113</sup>. The largest overall geographic area for location enabled Twitter accounts that support the Islamic State accounted for Iraq and Syria, predominantly in Islamic State controlled areas<sup>114</sup>. It should also be noted that of the location enabled Twitter accounts that support the Islamic State, none of them were from the United States and those from other Western states only accounted for single digit percentages<sup>115</sup>. However, based on the location provided in the Twitter accounts sampled for the Twitter Census, the number of location enabled accounts from Iraq and Syria were consistent with the location information provided in users' profiles, while the United States and the United Kingdom were the predominant locations of users from Western states<sup>116</sup>.

Even though sources like the Twitter Census provide important insights into accounts on social media platforms that support the Islamic State, it is important to take into consideration that the supporters on each platform only account for a portion of overall supporters for the Islamic State. For example, the Twitter Census only surveys the user accounts on the social

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<sup>110</sup> Berger, J.M. and Jonathan Morgan. 2015. "The ISIS Twitter Census." The Brookings Project on .S. Relations with the Islamic World 1-68.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

media platform Twitter, as the name of the study suggests<sup>117</sup>. However, certain populations prefer certain social media platforms over others. Tunisia is one example of this occurrence due to their population generally preferring the social media platform Facebook to Twitter<sup>118</sup>. In fact, in 2013, there were 300 Facebook accounts to every one Twitter account that belonged to Tunisian users<sup>119</sup>. This also fails to account for users located on other social media platforms, with both centralized and decentralized stores, such as Telegram and TikTok, that Islamic State supporting users have migrated to<sup>120</sup>.

### **The Islamic State on Social Media and Foreign Fighters**

The Internet has steadily influenced the radicalization of jihadists and foreign fighters since 9/11<sup>121</sup>. In fact, the percentage of jihadists that were radicalized online since 9/11 is 51%. Even more disturbing is that since 2013, the number of jihadists that were radicalized online has only increased<sup>122</sup>. The cases from 2013-2019 comprise 53% of the total cases since 9/11<sup>123</sup>. Furthermore, since 2014, the yearly percentage of jihadists radicalized online has been greater than the average percentage<sup>124</sup>. However, while this dataset measures the total number of jihadists that have been radicalized online, it does not specify the number of foreign fighters that have been radicalized online.

Moreover, another dataset from the New America Foundation indicates that approximately one third of their sample of foreign fighters were radicalized online or actively

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger. 2015. "Misrepresenting ISIS on Social Media." IntelWire.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Robertson, Adi. 2019. "TikTok removes two dozen ISIS propaganda accounts." The Verge.

<sup>121</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman. "Terrorism in America After 9/11." The New America Foundation.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

participated in online jihadist groups<sup>125</sup>. This is particularly common with women who conspire to join the Islamic State from Western states as ISIS Brides, such as Hoda Muthana and Shannon Conley<sup>126 127</sup>. As a result, women account for 1 in 7 of Western foreign fighters sampled by New America that joined the Islamic State<sup>128</sup>.

### **Criticisms of the Literature**

While the studies have been conducted have provided a quantitative value to the topic of intelligence led policing, these surveys were flawed. The key flaw is that these surveys were not addressed to patrol<sup>129 130</sup>. Instead they focused on administration, detectives, sergeants, and crimes analysts<sup>131 132</sup>. By doing so, they failed to receive responses from the law enforcement officers that potentially rely on and distribute intelligence information on a daily basis. One survey only received responses from four medium sized law enforcement agencies<sup>133</sup>. The other survey received responses from more law enforcement agencies, but the majority of them came from large agencies in the Midwest<sup>134</sup>. Osborn's survey also only asked open ended interview-like questions which could not be accurately coded or quantified<sup>135</sup>.

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<sup>125</sup> Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. 2015. "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism." The New America Foundation.

<sup>126</sup> Hall, Ellie. 2019. "An Alabama "ISIS Bride" Wants To Come Home. Can We Forgive Her Horrifying Social Media Posts?" BuzzFeed.

<sup>127</sup> Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. 2015. "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism." The New America Foundation.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Osborn, Brandon. 2018. "Crime Prevention: Methods to Improve Intelligence-Led Policing." ProQuest 1-220

<sup>130</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>131</sup> Osborn, Brandon. 2018. "Crime Prevention: Methods to Improve Intelligence-Led Policing." ProQuest 1-220

<sup>132</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>133</sup> Osborn, Brandon. 2018. "Crime Prevention: Methods to Improve Intelligence-Led Policing." ProQuest 1-220

<sup>134</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>135</sup> Osborn, Brandon. 2018. "Crime Prevention: Methods to Improve Intelligence-Led Policing." ProQuest 1-220



## **Chapter 1: Intelligence Led Policing in Countering Terrorism in the United States**

### **Introduction**

Intelligence led policing has been a buzz phrase for law enforcement agencies across the United States following the events of September 11, 2001. The conventional wisdom that was developed from those events was that local law enforcement agencies are the first line of defense against acts of terror. However, it also seemed that there was a lack of communication and transparency not only between federal agencies, but local law enforcement agencies as well. In an attempt to prevent future acts of terror in the United States, local law enforcement agencies began implementing intelligence led policing in their efforts to fight crime and terrorism in their communities. This paper analyzes whether intelligence led policing is an effective method to counter terrorism.

### **Methodology**

To assess if intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism option in the United States, I conducted a comparative case study of five American local law enforcement agencies. The agencies selected for this case study were the New York Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), Chicago Police Department (CPD), and Orlando Police Department (OPD). These agencies were selected for this study to provide a sample population that was geographically distributed across the United States.

For this case study of the five police departments, I used the University of Maryland's Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) data that tracked the number of

terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide from 1970-2017<sup>136</sup>. The data samples for this case study were from 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The data was broken at 1999/2000 as intelligence led policing did not truly come into fruition in the United States as a policing or countering terrorism method until after the attacks on 9/11.

### **Case Study**

For this case study, five local law enforcement agencies were selected from different areas of the United States in order to provide a diverse representation of law enforcement agencies that implemented intelligence policing. The law enforcement agencies selected – New York City Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Chicago Police Department, and Orlando Police Department – are large agencies in major urban areas. Local law enforcement agencies in rural areas are currently being excluded due to their lack of information reporting on intelligence led policing use and data.

The agencies selected represent varying department sizes and varying employee numbers. As stated in the literature review, local law enforcement agencies are less likely to implement intelligence led policing because their staffing is already inadequate<sup>137 138</sup>. Consequently, agency size will be discussed in terms of number of employees at the agencies, both sworn and non-sworn civilians. The distinction between sworn and civilian employees is important because local law enforcement agencies frequently hire non-sworn civilians as analysts for intelligence led policing functions instead of training their sworn officers in an intelligence capacity.

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<sup>136</sup> “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)”. 2018. Global Terrorism Database [Data file] <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

<sup>137</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA.” *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>138</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat.” *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

## New York City Police Department

The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is one of the most well-known local law enforcement agencies in the United States. The NYPD has approximately 55,000 employees – 36,000 sworn and 19,000 civilians<sup>139</sup>. They serve a city of approximately 8.5 million people and consisting of 77 precincts<sup>140</sup>. New York City had approximately 65.2 million tourists in 2018<sup>141</sup>. The NYPD has a budget of \$5.6 Billion<sup>142</sup>. The New York City Police Department has a dedicated Intelligence Bureau that implements intelligence led policing<sup>143</sup>. It should be noted that the NYPD did not create its Intelligence Bureau until after the 9/11 attacks<sup>144</sup>. A key component of the intelligence bureau is the Field Intelligence Officer program which allows chosen uniformed officers to “collect and disseminate” information to their respective precincts<sup>145</sup>. The NYPD intelligence bureau also has an international liaison program which allows the agency to station officers in different law enforcement agencies around the world to support their intelligence function<sup>146</sup>.

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<sup>139</sup> “About NYPD.” New York City Police Department. <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page>

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Doyle, Andrea. January 2019. “New York City Again Sets Tourism Record as It Roars Into 2019.” *North Star Meetings Group* <https://www.northstarmetingsgroup.com/news/industry/new-york-city-2018-tourism-statistics-record>

<sup>142</sup> The City Council of New York. 2018. “Report of the Finance Division on the Fiscal 2019 Preliminary Budget and the Fiscal 2018 Preliminary Mayor’s Management Report for the New York Police Department.” The City Council of New York <https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19-New-York-Police-Department.pdf>

<sup>143</sup> “Intelligence.” New York City Police Department <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/investigative/intelligence.page>

<sup>144</sup> Svab, Peter. 2016. “How 9/11 Changed the NYPD: Inside the elite counterterrorism unit that helps keep New York safe.” *Epoch Times* [https://www.theepochtimes.com/how-911-changed-the-nypd\\_2150404.html](https://www.theepochtimes.com/how-911-changed-the-nypd_2150404.html)

<sup>145</sup> “Intelligence.” New York City Police Department <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/investigative/intelligence.page>

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

The NYPD also has a Counter Terrorism Bureau aimed at preventing terrorism on the local law enforcement level<sup>147</sup>. The Counter Terrorism Bureau has its own Terrorism Threat Analysis Group that analyzes and distributes intelligence related to terrorism<sup>148</sup>. In 2016, the Counter Terrorism Bureau had more than 525 employees dedicated to the prevention of terrorism<sup>149</sup>. The Counter Terrorism Bureau also houses their Joint Terrorist Task Force that works with their local fusion center<sup>150</sup>. The changes made to the agency by the NYPD following 9/11 set the bar for local law enforcement agencies around the country. Many local law enforcement agencies, especially those in major urban areas, began to implement similar changes and intelligence led policing.

## **Los Angeles Police Department**

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is another well-known law enforcement agency in the United States. The LAPD has approximately 12,857 employees – 9,988 sworn and 2,869 civilians<sup>151</sup>. They serve a city of approximately 4,007,147 people<sup>152</sup>. Los Angeles had 50 million tourists in 2018<sup>153</sup>. The LAPD has budget of \$1.6 Billion<sup>154</sup>. The LAPD has a dedicated intelligence investigations section within their Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

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<sup>147</sup> "Counterterrorism." New York City Police Department <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/investigative/counterterrorism.page>

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Svab, Peter. 2016. "How 9/11 Changed the NYPD: Inside the elite counterterrorism unit that helps keep New York safe." Epoch Times [https://www.theepochtimes.com/how-911-changed-the-nypd\\_2150404.html](https://www.theepochtimes.com/how-911-changed-the-nypd_2150404.html)

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> FBI. 2017. "Table 78." Crime in the United States <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view>

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> "Los Angeles 2018 Quick Facts." *Los Angeles Tourism and Convention Board* <https://www.discoverlosangeles.com/sites/default/files/2019-05/2018%20QUICK%20FACTS.pdf>

<sup>154</sup> City of Los Angeles. 2018. "City of Los Angeles 2018-19 Budget." City of Los Angeles [http://cao.lacity.org/budget18-19/2018-19Proposed\\_Budget.pdf](http://cao.lacity.org/budget18-19/2018-19Proposed_Budget.pdf)

that implements intelligence led policing<sup>155</sup>. The LAPD Counter-Terrorism bureau was last reported to have approximately 300 employees dedicated to its mission<sup>156</sup>. The Counter-Terrorism bureau has implemented a terrorism liaison officer program that allows officers to collect data on possible local terrorist threats and the bureau utilizes their local fusion center<sup>157</sup>.

### **Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department**

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) became more well known following the Las Vegas Shooting in 2017. The LVMPD has approximately 5,379 employees – 3,563 sworn and 1,816 civilians<sup>158</sup>. They serve a city of approximately 1,627,244 people<sup>159</sup>. Las Vegas had 42,116,800 tourists in 2018<sup>160</sup>. LVMPD has a budget of \$601,072,198<sup>161</sup>. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has a dedicated Homeland Security Division that implements intelligence led policing and actively utilizes their local fusion center, Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center<sup>162</sup>.

### **Chicago Police Department**

The city of Chicago is well known for its high crime rates and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is also well known as a result. The CPD has approximately 13,566 employees

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<sup>155</sup> LAPD Online. "Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau." Inside the LAPD [http://www.lapdonline.org/inside\\_the\\_lapd/content\\_basic\\_view/6502](http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/6502)

<sup>156</sup> "Counterterrorism and Crime Fighting in Los Angeles." Los Angeles Police Department's Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/LAPD-Stein.pdf>

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> FBI. 2017. "Table 78." Crime in the United States <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view>

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> "Las Vegas Historic Tourism Statistics 1970-2019." *Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority* [https://assets.simpleviewcms.com/simpleview/image/upload/v1/clients/lasvegas/Historical\\_1970\\_to\\_2019\\_ada0164b-b599-4fac-8f7a-eb26bfe17187.pdf](https://assets.simpleviewcms.com/simpleview/image/upload/v1/clients/lasvegas/Historical_1970_to_2019_ada0164b-b599-4fac-8f7a-eb26bfe17187.pdf)

<sup>161</sup> Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. 2018. "Final Budget FY 2018-2019." Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department [https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/Budgets/FY2018-2019\\_FinalBudget.pdf](https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/Budgets/FY2018-2019_FinalBudget.pdf)

<sup>162</sup> "Homeland Security." Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/HomelandSecurity.aspx>

– 12,383 sworn and 1,183 civilians<sup>163</sup>. They serve a city of approximately 2,706,171 people<sup>164</sup>. Chicago had 57.6 million tourists in 2018<sup>165</sup>. The CPD has a budget of CPD: \$1.492 Billion<sup>166</sup>. The Chicago Police Department has its own dedicated fusion center which handles their intelligence operations and is housed in their Deployment Operations Section<sup>167</sup>. Along with the use of their fusion center, the Chicago Police Department has mostly used intelligence led policing in their efforts to reduce gun violence in their communities<sup>168</sup>.

### **Orlando Police Department**

The Orlando Police Department (OPD) became more well known following the Pulse Night Club shooting 2016. The OPD has approximately 926 employees – 714 sworn and 212 civilians<sup>169</sup>. They serve a city of approximately 283,982 people<sup>170</sup>. Orlando had 75 million tourists in 2018<sup>171</sup>. The OPD has a budget of \$175,792,908<sup>172</sup>. The Orlando Police Department has a dedicated intelligence unit housed by their Violent Crimes Initiative, which handles their intelligence operations. However, the Orlando Police Department recently decided to restructure

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<sup>163</sup> FBI. 2017. "Table 78." Crime in the United States <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view>

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Rackl, Lori. January 2019. "Chicago sets new tourism record with nearly 58 million visitors in 2018 — and the mayor is thrilled." *The Chicago Tribune* <https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/ct-trav-chicago-tourism-record-numbers-2018-0111-story.html>

<sup>166</sup> Mayor Rahm Emanuel. 2018. "2018 Budget Recommendations." City of Chicago [https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp\\_info/2018Budget/2018\\_Budget\\_Recommendations.pdf](https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2018Budget/2018_Budget_Recommendations.pdf)

<sup>167</sup> Chicago Police Department. 2017. "Special Order S03-04-04." Chicago Police Department <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-13ed7140-08513-ed71-4ced9c378c05dec.html>

<sup>168</sup> LeCates, Rich. 2018. "Intelligence-led Policing: Changing the Face of Crime Prevention." Police Chief online <http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/changing-the-face-crime-prevention/>

<sup>169</sup> FBI. 2017. "Table 78." Crime in the United States <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view>

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Cordeiro, Monivette. May 2019. "A record 75 million people visited Orlando in 2018." *Orlando Weekly* <https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2019/05/10/a-record-75-million-people-visited-orlando-in-2018>

<sup>172</sup> Office of Business and Financial Services Staff. 2018. "Annual Budget 2018/2019." City of Orlando

their agency, allowing for the creation of a Special Enforcement Division that will be focused on intelligence led policing to “prevent and reduce crime”<sup>173</sup>.

## **Findings**

As a part of the case study, I utilize data collected by the University of Maryland and the New America. The University of Maryland has created the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) program. As a part of the START program, they created the Global Terrorism Database that collects information on terrorism globally from 1970 through 2017<sup>174</sup>. Data is not added to the database unless the credibility of the reporting source has been confirmed. START contains data “on over 180,000 terrorist attacks”<sup>175</sup>. The database created by START is also the “most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist attacks in the world” and was created so terrorism can be “readily studied and defeated”<sup>176</sup>. While selecting terrorism criteria for a database search, I selected terrorism criteria to include acts that are outside of legitimate warfare activities, to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal with evidence that it was intended to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience beyond the immediate victims of the acts<sup>177</sup>. The Global Terrorism Database provided by START is open to the public and is not directly reported to any law enforcement or government agency.

New America is a think tank that employs academics and policy experts to assemble research on issues faced by the modern United States. As a result of this, New America created

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<sup>173</sup> “City of Orlando Puts More Officers out in the Community.” 2019. City of Orlando <http://www.cityoforlando.net/news/2019/04/city-of-orlando-puts-more-officers-out-in-the-community/>

<sup>174</sup> “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)”. 2018. Global Terrorism Database [Data file] <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

an “up-to-date source of online information about terrorist activity in the United States and by Americans overseas since 9/11”<sup>178</sup>. New America collected data not only on people who have been criminally charged for successful terror attacks for this source, but also collected data on people who have been charged for attacks that were not completed<sup>179</sup>. This is important because it paints a more accurate picture of the number of attempted counterterrorism acts, where many such terrorist plans were prevented by law enforcement on the federal, state, or local level. The data provided by New America is also open to the public and not directly reported to any law enforcement or government agency.

The data provided by the START program by the University of Maryland implies that intelligence led policing is an effective method for countering terrorism in the United States<sup>180</sup>. I conducted a comparative case study of five local law enforcement agencies in the United States based on this data, comparing terrorist attacks between 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The results are as follows:


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<sup>178</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman. “Terrorism in America After 9/11.” The New America Foundation.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)”. 2018. Global Terrorism Database [Data file] <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>





As demonstrated by the START data, in the 17 years leading up to 9/11, New York City had 67 terrorist attacks, Los Angeles had 11, Las Vegas had one, Chicago had seven, and Orlando had zero<sup>181</sup>. In the 17 years following 9/11, New York City had 32 terrorist attacks, Los Angeles had three, Las Vegas had six, Chicago had two, and Orlando had one<sup>182</sup>.

Three out of the five local law enforcement agencies studied (New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago) saw a decrease in the amount of terror attacks perpetrated since 9/11<sup>183</sup>. However, two out of the five local law enforcement agencies studied (Las Vegas and Orlando) saw an increase in the amount of terror attacks perpetrated since 9-11<sup>184</sup>. It should be noted that all five local law enforcement agencies studied have implemented some level of intelligence led policing post 9/11.

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
<sup>181</sup> Ibid.


<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

With Las Vegas and Orlando demonstrating an increase in terror attacks post 9/11 even though they have implemented intelligence led policing, it seems there may be a more significant variable related to whether intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism method in the United States or not. Upon further investigation of these five agencies, a relationship was noticed between the cities that saw a decrease in terror attacks post 9/11 and their budgets. The three cities that saw a decrease in terror attacks post 9/11 have budgets in the billions, whereas the cities that saw an increase in terror attacks post 9/11 have budgets that are only in the millions.





When analyzing the employees per capita and budget per capita between the police departments as possible more significant variables, it was found that the cities that did not see increases in terror attacks had a larger amount of employees and larger budgets per capita compared to the cities that did see increases in terror attacks. New York Police Department had 0.00647 employees per capita for their population, 0.00084 employees per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00075 employees per capita for their combined population. The Los Angeles Police Department had 0.00321 employees per capita for their population, 0.00026 employees per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00024 employees per capita for their combined population. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department had 0.00331 employees per capita for their population, 0.00013 employees per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00012 employees per capita for their combined population. Chicago Police Department had 0.00501 employees per capita for their population, 0.00024 employees per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00022 employees per capita for their combined population. The Orlando Police Department had 0.00326 employees per capita for their population, 0.00001 employees per

capita for their tourist population, and 0.00001 employees per capita for their combined population. Similarly, the New York Police Department had \$658.82 per capita for their population, \$858.90 per capita for their tourist population, and \$75.98 per capita for their combined population. The Los Angeles Police Department had \$399.29 per capita for their population, \$32 per capita for their tourist population, and \$29.63 per capita for their combined population. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department had \$369.38 per capita for their population, \$14.27 per capita for their tourist population, and \$13.74 per capita for their combined population. The Chicago Police Department had \$551.33 per capita for their population, \$25.90 per capita for their tourist population, and \$24.74 per capita for their combined population. Orlando Police Department had \$619.03 per capita for their population, \$2.34 per capita for their tourist population, and \$2.34 per capita for their combined population. Based upon this information, no matter how effective intelligence led policing may be as a method to counter terrorism on its own, it appears it cannot be effectively implemented by agencies with smaller budgets and number of employees. Based upon this information, no matter how effective intelligence led policing may be as a method to counter terrorism on its own, it appears it cannot be effectively implemented by agencies with smaller budgets and number of employees.

Data from New America also supports that intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism method, but on a national scale. The New America data asserts that 425 people were charged with engaging in jihadist terrorism, or related activities<sup>185</sup>. This data includes people who were charged for activities in the United States, Americans who were charged for

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

these activities abroad, and people who died the year they were charged for these activities<sup>186</sup>.

This same data states that 48% of jihadists are monitored by an informant, 24% of jihadists were implicated by a tip from family members or the community, and 9% of jihadists were implicated by a tip from the general public<sup>187</sup>. This means that law enforcement agencies are obtaining information on 81% of jihadists from members of their community<sup>188</sup>.

At face value, it does appear that intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism method. However, it does appear that budget may be connected to the effectiveness rate of intelligence led policing in certain cities. Which means, if true, those law enforcement agencies that do not have large budgets will not be able to effectively implement intelligence led policing. This would be due to the previously mentioned lack of resources, funding, training, and manpower<sup>189 190 191 192</sup>. It appears the question that needs to be answered may not be if intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism method as it currently stands, but if it is an effective method for counter terrorism in a nation with a decentralized local law enforcement structure that is not funded by the federal government.

## Conclusion

Overall, it appears that intelligence led policing post-9/11 is an effective counter terrorism method and is quite possibly the most effective police method for counter terrorism to

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. "Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the USA." *Policing and Society* 25: 333-357

<sup>190</sup> Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. "Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering the Terrorism Threat." *The Homeland Security Review* 7: 265-283

<sup>191</sup> McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. 2007. "Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23: 142-158

<sup>192</sup> Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. "Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20: 253-260

date. The greatest challenge facing local law enforcement agencies in the effective implementation of intelligence led policing is its cost. For many agencies that have smaller budgets, the implementation of intelligence led policing can be a financial burden. Those same agencies that are unable to afford the resources, training, and staff required to implement intelligence led policing effectively are also less likely to utilize their local fusion centers regularly as they do not have training on how to use this resource or what to do with the information gained from it. A federal grant program to assist local law enforcement agencies in bridging their funding gap to effectively implement intelligence led policing would likely be an effective solution for those cities that have difficulty implementing it. The Department of Homeland Security already has a grant program for fiscal year 2020 called the “Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program”<sup>193</sup>. However, this program relies on competitive grant proposals to determine grant funding and it is available to “State, local, tribal, and territorial governments (including agencies and departments of those governments), nonprofits, and institutions of higher education”<sup>194</sup>. This grant program is problematic because it does not provide funding to agencies who demonstrate the greatest need for funding in order to effectively implement intelligence led policing. The Department of Homeland Security’s grant program is also problematic because the grant proposals are geared towards “assist[ing] in developing a nationwide prevention framework to combat targeted violence and terrorism...”, which would prevent agencies from utilizing the grant funding to hire analysts or provide intelligence led policing training to current agency staff<sup>195</sup>. Similarly, the creation of a national standard for intelligence led policing, at minimum training on how to utilize the fusion centers

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<sup>193</sup> Department of Homeland Security. “Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.” <https://www.dhs.gov/tvtpgrants>

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

effectively, would also be an effective solution for those cities that have difficulty implementing intelligence led policing effectively, such as a definition similar to the one provided earlier in this paper.

## **Chapter 2: Intelligence Led Policing in the Five Eyes Community**

### **Introduction**

Global terrorism is far from being anything new, but since the attacks on September 11, 2001, it has become a normal part of life for many people. As a result of the attacks, many governments enacted national security measures and tasked different law enforcement agencies to safeguard the security of their homeland. However, the role of law enforcement in counterterrorism extends beyond federal agencies with nationwide jurisdiction. It also lies in the hands of local law enforcement personnel that encounter their community regularly. Countries with decentralized law enforcement structures, such as the United States, where local law enforcement agencies are far removed from federal agencies, tend to experience issues relating to funding initiatives like intelligence led policing. It is for this reason that countries with more centralized law enforcement structures would be more likely to experience success with implementing intelligence led policing as a counterterrorism method.

### **Methodology**

To assess if intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism option in the Five Eyes community, I conducted a comparative case study of its five member states. The member states selected for this case study were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These member states provide a large population sample that includes citizens of different cultural, political, and socioeconomic backgrounds.

For this case study, I used START data from the University of Maryland that tracked the number of terror attacks that occurred worldwide from 1970-2017<sup>196</sup>. The data samples for this case study were from 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The data was broken at 1999/2000 as intelligence led policing did not truly come into fruition in some Five Eyes community member states as a policing or counter terrorism method until after the attacks on 9/11. The definition of terrorism utilized to collect this terrorism data was that terrorism is an act, outside of legitimate warfare activities, to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal with evidence that it was intended to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience beyond the immediate victims of the act<sup>197</sup>.

### **Case Study**

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all a part of an international intelligence sharing group called the Five Eyes Community. The Five Eyes Community allows the free flow of intelligence information between all of its member states. It is also important to note that these member states are culturally similar and have had similar experiences with terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, all five of the member states' law enforcement agencies have implemented intelligence led policing on some level.

#### **Australia**

Australia has its own federal police force, along with local law enforcement agencies for its states. Local law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that state, along with the laws of the country. This is similar to the structure of the United States. Australia has a similar

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<sup>196</sup> "National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)". 2018. *Global Terrorism Database [Data file]* <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

<sup>197</sup> "National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)." 2018. *Global Terrorism Database [Data file]* <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>



counter radicalization program to the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy. Their federally funded program also relies on law enforcement and the community to refer any citizens that are at risk for radicalization to their intervention programs<sup>198</sup>. However, the government funds these intervention programs with their Live Safe Together Grants Programme<sup>199</sup>. This allows organizations within the community to take charge of the deradicalization process, instead of the government<sup>200</sup>.

## Canada

Canada has its own federal police force, along with local law enforcement agencies for its provinces. Local law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that province, along with the laws of the country. This is similar to the structure of the United States. Canada's threat level has remained at "medium" since 2016<sup>201</sup>. This threat level, however, only means there is a potential for a violent act of terrorism to occur in Canada<sup>202</sup>. The large majority of cases of radicalization to extremism Canada faces center around foreign fighters. As such, Canada has been slowly lagging behind their Five Eyes peers when it comes to counter-radicalization policies<sup>203</sup>. On the federal level, Canadian agencies are focused on intelligence and law

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<sup>198</sup> "Countering violent extremism (CVE) intervention programs." Australian Government Department of Home Affairs <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-extremism-and-terrorism/cve-intervention-programs>

<sup>199</sup> "Countering violent extremism (CVE) intervention programs." Australian Government Department of Home Affairs <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-extremism-and-terrorism/cve-intervention-programs>

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Babcock, Ashlee, Priyanka Bahl, Ousmane Diallo, Kayla Grant, and Ameera Mukadam. 2017. "Targeting Radicalization to Violence through Coordination and Cooperation." *Cracks in the Liberal International Order 2018 Global Trends Report*. Balsillie School of International Affairs 75-80.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2016. "How the War Was 'One': Countering violent extremism and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in Canada." *Journal for Deradicalization* 6: 272-304.

enforcement operations<sup>204</sup>. On the local level, Canadian agencies are focused on community outreach and proactivity<sup>205</sup>. As a result of Canada not meeting local needs, Canadian municipalities have created their own programs to counter radicalization to violent extremism<sup>206</sup>. Montreal created the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence<sup>207</sup>. The Center for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence focuses on educating members of the community about the warning signs of radicalization to violent extremism and endeavors to identify at-risk individuals in the community as a result<sup>208</sup>. Calgary created the Re-Direct Program<sup>209</sup>. The Re-Direct Program has targeted Canadian youths in an attempt stop the radicalization process before it even has the chance to take effect<sup>210</sup>. The program takes referrals from concerned persons in the community on citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization to violent extremism<sup>211</sup>. Then, the program assesses the vulnerable person's vulnerabilities, taking into consideration their "background, family and any other relevant information"<sup>212</sup>.

## **New Zealand**

New Zealand has a national police force called the New Zealand Police. This law enforcement agency is responsible for enforcing New Zealand's laws throughout the country. However, New

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<sup>204</sup> Babcock, Ashlee, Priyanka Bahl, Ousmane Diallo, Kayla Grant, and Ameera Mukadam. 2017. "Targeting Radicalization to Violence through Coordination and Cooperation." *Cracks in the Liberal International Order 2018 Global Trends Report*. Balsillie School of International Affairs 75-80.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Berube, Maxime. 2015. "Implementing Montreal's Centre for the prevention of radicalization leading to violence: Insights from the 2015 TSAS Summer Academy." *University of Montreal*.

<sup>209</sup> Babcock, Ashlee, Priyanka Bahl, Ousmane Diallo, Kayla Grant, and Ameera Mukadam. 2017. "Targeting Radicalization to Violence through Coordination and Cooperation." *Cracks in the Liberal International Order 2018 Global Trends Report*. Balsillie School of International Affairs 75-80.

<sup>210</sup> Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2016. "How the War Was 'One': Countering violent extremism and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in Canada." *Journal for Deradicalization* 6: 272-304.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

Zealand does not have local law enforcement agencies, unlike the other Five Eyes member states. There is little published about New Zealand's counter radicalization strategies. However, it is known that they actively participate in the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee and the United Nations in order to establish better counter radicalization strategies for the future<sup>213 214</sup>.

## **The United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom was the first of the Five Eyes member states to implement intelligence led policing prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001. The United Kingdom has its own federal police force, along with territorial law enforcement agencies for its states. Territorial law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that territory, along with the laws of the country. However, the law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom do have cross jurisdictional powers that extend beyond the territory they are serving. The United Kingdom has implemented their Prevent Strategy in order to counter radicalization and terrorism in their country, but it is a federally funded and locally implemented strategy<sup>215</sup>. Prevent focuses on building relationships with communities within the United Kingdom and utilizing those relationships to gain tips about people who may have become radicalized<sup>216</sup>. The United Kingdom also has a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit that "removed more than 55,000 pieces of online terrorist material in 2015"<sup>217</sup>. The Prevent Strategy also tasks local law

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<sup>213</sup> "Counter-terrorism." *Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet* <https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/national-security/counter-terrorism>

<sup>214</sup> "Designated Terrorist Entities." *New Zealand Police* <https://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities>

<sup>215</sup> Mastroe, Caitlin. 2016. "Evaluating CVE: Understanding the Recent Changes to the United Kingdom's Implementation of Prevent." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10:2 50-60.

<sup>216</sup> "United Kingdom: Extremism & Counter-Extremism." *Counter-Extremism Project*. <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom>

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

enforcement and school officials with reporting any activity that may indicate a person is at risk of becoming radicalized. However, this strategy has received many criticisms. Among these criticisms are the targeting of Muslim communities and the inclusion of sympathizers in their targeting strategy<sup>218</sup>. In 2015, approximately 70% of the referrals to the Prevent program were related to Islamic extremism<sup>219</sup>. This may be a result of a legitimate uptick in Islamic radicalization, or it may be the result of a cultural bias within the United Kingdom against Muslim communities. Furthermore, by including nonviolent radicals and sympathizers in the group of people targeted by Prevent, they are potentially also infringing on legitimate political activity<sup>220</sup>.

## **The United States**

The United States has its own federal police agencies, along with state law enforcement agencies for its states. State law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that state, along with the laws of the country. The United States also has local law enforcement agencies that are responsible for enforcing local ordinances for their city or county on top of enforcing their state and federal laws. The United States does not implement a nationally standardized strategy for intelligence led policing or counterterrorism. The only nationally standardized program created and used by the United States has been the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System. Fusion Centers were created in the United States in an effort to increase transparency among local, state, and federal agencies. However, restricting intelligence

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<sup>218</sup> Richards, Anthony. 2011. "The problem with 'radicalization': the remit of 'Prevent' and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK." *International Affairs* 87:1 143-152

<sup>219</sup> "United Kingdom: Extremism & Counter-Extremism." *Counter-Extremism Project*.  
<https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom>

<sup>220</sup> Richards, Anthony. 2011. "The problem with 'radicalization': the remit of 'Prevent' and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK." *International Affairs* 87:1 143-152

operations only out of fusion centers limits the ability of agencies to gather and share intelligence<sup>221</sup>. Unfortunately, law enforcement officers rarely receive intelligence from the fusion centers, even though patrol officers would benefit the most from the information<sup>222</sup>. The utilization of these fusion centers was supposed to, ideally, allow agencies that have limited resources to implement intelligence led policing effectively<sup>223</sup>. Instead, local law enforcement agencies are some of the least likely to utilize fusion centers. Another key issue with the emphasis on the utilization of fusion centers is that they tend to be located and focused on major urban areas in the United States. As such, local law enforcement agencies that are located in urban areas are more likely to utilize fusion centers than those located in rural areas<sup>224</sup>.

## **Findings**


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<sup>221</sup> Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. "Working Towards Intelligence-Led Policing: The Phoenix Police Department Intelligence Officer Program." *Oxford University Press* 12: 332-343.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Lewandowski, Carla, Jeremy G. Carter, and Walter L. Campbell. 2017. "The Utility of Fusion Centers to Enhance Intelligence-Led Policing: An Exploration of End-Users." *Oxford University Press* 12: 177-193.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.



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Between 1982 and 1999, Australia had 41 terror attacks, Canada had 32, New Zealand had 5, the United Kingdom had 1858, and the United States had 698. Contrastingly, between 2000 and 2017, Australia had 44 terror attacks, Canada had 50, New Zealand had 11, the United Kingdom had 1023, and the United States had 443. Strangely, the United Kingdom and the United States were the only two countries to see decreases in the number of terror attacks in their countries following the implementation of intelligence led policing. That being said, the increases were only marginal compared to the significant decreases of the other two states. The findings of this data allude to the fact that implementation of intelligence led policing alone is not a significant enough variable to explain the number of terror attacks in any particular time frame. Instead, it seems that not only are other variables in play, but that they may have a more significant role in

<sup>225</sup> "National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)". 2018. *Global Terrorism Database [Data file]* <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

conjunction with intelligence led policing. It also seems from this data that the centralized versus decentralized structure of law enforcement agencies in these states have little to no impact on the implementation of intelligence led policing and terror attacks during a particular time frame. The country with the most decentralized law enforcement structure, the United States, saw one of the greatest decreases in terror attacks following the implementation of intelligence led policing. Perhaps other variables that should be considered in future case studies would be funding and how long intelligence led policing had been implemented in a country for a particular period of time.

### **Conclusion**

Counterterrorism has been at the forefront of global priorities, especially since September 11, 2001, and especially in the Five Eyes Community. One of the steps that these countries and their local communities have taken to counter terrorism is the implementation of intelligence led policing. This serves to interrupt the radicalization process by working with the community. Local law enforcement agencies in the United States have found it difficult to implement intelligence led policing effectively due to lack of funding and training that is primarily the result of being far removed from the federal government. In theory, this meant the opposite would occur in countries that have more centralized law enforcement structures, like the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, as the findings of the case study show, it seems the level of how centralized a country's law enforcement structure is seems to be unrelated to, or at least minimally impacts, the number of terror attacks in these countries since the implementation of intelligence led policing. Other variables to consider for future testing would include population size and the number of law enforcement agencies in each country. The United States and United Kingdom have larger populations and more law enforcement agencies

than New Zealand, for example. Another factor to consider is government involvement in intervention programs. Programs from the United States and United Kingdom have received criticism due to cultural biases, but Australia allows community organizations to implement intervention programs with government grants. As for intelligence led policing, it has been criticized for racial bias as well, but has typically been viewed as an effective method of overall policing. Perhaps creating community partnerships with the whole community, instead of targeting specific cultural or racial groups, will allow for this to be a more effective strategy against terrorism in the future. Furthermore, all of the countries in the case study faced similar difficulties with transparency and how to define terrorism, radicalization, and intelligence led policing. It should be the goal of these individual countries, or together in the Five Eyes Community, to standardize these terms. The data used in this paper was unbiased but, limited. Unfortunately, there are still few academics that actively measure or study terrorism activity. Future studies may want to use a greater amount of data, if it is available.

### **Chapter 3: Islamic State Propaganda and Intelligence Led Policing**

#### **Introduction**

Between 2013 and 2014, there has been an increase of terrorist propaganda on social media, particularly by the Islamic State. As such, this development has turned the Internet and social media into one of the fastest growing breeding grounds to radicalize citizens for the group's cause. Much of the propaganda has been directed towards Western populations to serve two different purposes. These purposes are to both garner fear and attention from Western populations, as well as recruit potential foreign fighters to join their organization. This research project seeks to analyze the methods in which the Islamic State publishes propaganda on social media platforms to garner the attention of Western populations and the occurrence of foreign



fighters that originate from Western states, as well as how intelligence led policing can be utilized by law enforcement to reduce terrorist propaganda online and radicalization to violence amongst citizens in their communities.

### **Intelligence Led Policing**

As a solution to the occurrence of radicalization to violence of foreign fighters and jihadists in general, separate from social media, is the widespread implementation of versions of intelligence led policing in Western states. In Canada, for example, Montreal created the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence<sup>226</sup>. The Center for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence focuses on educating members of the community about the warning signs of radicalization to violent extremism and endeavors to identify at-risk individuals in the community as a result<sup>227</sup>. This program also has created a 24/7 hotline for members of the community to utilize<sup>228</sup>. Calgary created the Re-Direct Program<sup>229</sup>. The Re-Direct Program has targeted Canadian youths in an attempt stop the radicalization process before it even has the chance to take effect<sup>230</sup>. The program takes referrals from concerned persons in the community on citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization to violent extremism<sup>231</sup>. Then, the program assesses the vulnerable person's vulnerabilities, taking into consideration their "background,

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<sup>226</sup> Babcock, Ashlee, Priyanka Bahl, Ousmane Diallo, Kayla Grant, and Ameera Mukadam. 2017. "Targeting Radicalization to Violence through Coordination and Cooperation." *Cracks in the Liberal International Order 2018 Global Trends Report*. Balsillie School of International Affairs 75-80.

<sup>227</sup> Berube, Maxime. 2015. "Implementing Montreal's Centre for the prevention of radicalization leading to violence: Insights from the 2015 TSAS Summer Academy." University of Montreal.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>229</sup> Babcock, Ashlee, Priyanka Bahl, Ousmane Diallo, Kayla Grant, and Ameera Mukadam. 2017. "Targeting Radicalization to Violence through Coordination and Cooperation." *Cracks in the Liberal International Order 2018 Global Trends Report*. Balsillie School of International Affairs 75-80.

<sup>230</sup> Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2016. "How the War Was 'One': Countering violent extremism and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in Canada." *Journal for Deradicalization* 6: 272-304.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

family and any other relevant information”<sup>232</sup>. Local law enforcement agencies have also continued to implement intelligence led policing as they have the most experience interacting with violent extremist behavior and the rest of their communities<sup>233</sup>. In support of this, 53% of jihadists that were captured in the United States from 9/11 to present were taken into custody as a result of an informant in their community and 23% were taken into custody as a result of a tip provided by family members or the community<sup>234</sup>. As observed in the findings of this research, the role that online propaganda from internet mujahideen on social media platforms only account for a portion of citizens that were radicalized to violence. Thus, it is also important to build relationships between law enforcement and local communities to also address the issue of radicalization from family or the community.

### **Implementing Intelligence Led Policing Online to Fight Terrorist Propaganda**

Even though intelligence led policing is often a solution to combat terrorists in general, outside of social media, it can be employed online to fight terrorist propaganda. Intelligence led policing has a role in combatting terrorist propaganda because tips about potential terrorist internet activity is frequently received by submissions from the local community. For example, units such as the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit have been effective in removing online terrorist propaganda material<sup>235</sup>. Such units utilize a different version of intelligence led policing in the virtual realm. Citizens are encouraged by law enforcement to report any suspected terrorist propaganda, which is then reviewed by law enforcement, and

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman. “Terrorism in America After 9/11.” The New America Foundation.

<sup>235</sup> “United Kingdom: Extremism & Counter-Extremism.” Counter-Extremism Project.  
<https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom>.

subsequently removed by the specialized unit<sup>236</sup>. This is similar to conventional intelligence led policing that relies on citizens to report any potential terrorist activity to law enforcement in their communities. The implementation of such specialized units that utilize online intelligence led policing on local or national levels would likely be effective in fighting in terrorist propaganda from the Islamic State, as well as similar groups.

## **Methodology**


For this research project, two datasets were utilized from the New America Foundation that address the radicalization of jihadists on social media. Utilizing these datasets, I conducted a comparative case study between the percentage of total jihadists that were radicalized online from 2013 to 2019 and the percentage of foreign fighters that were radicalized online from 2013 to 2019. The comparative case study aims to assess the influence of Islamic State propaganda published on social media on the radicalization of foreign fighters from Western states.

## **Findings**

From 2013 to present, social media platforms have played a significant role in disseminating propaganda for the Islamic State, as well as radicalizing potential new members for the organization. Even in the instances in which jihadists were radicalized due in part to a personal connection with a family member or friend that were radicalized, many were still contacted or partially radicalized online as well. The figure below represents the percentage of jihadists that have been radicalized online from 2013 to present.

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
<sup>236</sup> Ibid.



Assuming that approximately one third of the jihadists that were radicalized online are foreign fighters from Western states, the figure below represents the percentage of foreign fighters that have been radicalized online from 2013 to present<sup>238</sup>.

<sup>237</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman. "Terrorism in America After 9/11." The New America Foundation.


<sup>238</sup> Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. 2015. "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism." The New America Foundation.



Comparatively, the percentage of overall jihadists that have been radicalized online between 2013 to present has been significantly larger than the percentage of foreign fighters that have been radicalized online between 2013 to present.

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid.



Furthermore, the Twitter Census data had similar findings, determined both by geolocation from location enabled Twitter user accounts and profile information that the majority of Islamic State online are from states located in the Middle East, whereas supporters from the West accounted for very small percentages<sup>242</sup>. In fact, supporters from Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia accounted for more than half of the geolocated location enabled accounts (55%). Comparatively, the percentage from Western states that were sampled to geolocate location enabled Twitter user accounts that support the Islamic State was nominal (France: 0.006891%, Brazil: 0.004594%, United Kingdom: 0.002297%, Australia: 0.002297%, and Belgium: 0.002297%)<sup>243</sup>. Twitter users whose locations were determined based off profile information

<sup>240</sup> Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. 2015. "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism." The New America Foundation.

<sup>241</sup> Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman. "Terrorism in America After 9/11." The New America Foundation.

<sup>242</sup> Berger, J.M. and Jonathan Morgan. 2015. "The ISIS Twitter Census." The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World 1-68.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

were also predominantly from Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (50.36%)<sup>244</sup>. Contrastingly, the United States only accounted for 11.14% of users, while the United Kingdom only accounted for 3.83% of users<sup>245</sup>.

Based upon the findings of both New America datasets and the Twitter Census data, it appears that while the Islamic State's propaganda may target Western populations to garner public attention, it does not appear they are particularly successful at recruiting foreign fighters as a result of the propaganda material that the Islamic State internet mujahideen posts on social media platforms. Familial or community ties to jihadism may still be a better predicting variable to determine the probability of a Western citizen radicalizing to violence as a foreign fighter in support of the Islamic State when compared to those radicalized online. The New America Foundation determined that the percentage of foreign fighters that have familial or community ties to jihadism was approximately one third<sup>246</sup>. Of that third of foreign fighters, approximately two thirds of fighters have a relative that is already fighting in support of jihad in the Middle East and one third of fighters have a connection through marriage<sup>247</sup>.

However, taking into consideration that the propaganda disseminated on social media platforms may not be the most effective method to radicalize and recruit foreign fighters, it should be noted that this is not the dominant goal of the propaganda dissemination by the Islamic State's internet mujahideen. It is important to remember that the Islamic State is first and foremost a foreign terrorist organization. Therefore, their primary goal in disseminating propaganda through the media, including on social media platforms, is to not only garner

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<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. 2015. "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism." The New America Foundation.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

attention from Western populations but, to also strike fear into and terrorize those same populations the propaganda is directed towards. Case in point, more positive propaganda, such as provision of humanitarian aid and utilities to those who resided within Islamic State controlled territory, was rarely disseminated on social media platforms like Twitter. In contrast, more appalling propaganda videos that struck fear and outrage in Western populations, such as the video of the burning of the Jordanian pilot, have been more widely distributed on social media platforms, as well as mass media.

## **Solutions**

### **Removal from Mainstream Social Media Platforms**

The actions of mainstream social media platforms and governments to push Islamic State users off of their services appears to possibly be the most effective solution to eradicate Islamic State propaganda from social media. The Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology conducted a study in July 2019 that found that radical groups do not necessarily thrive when they are removed from mainstream social media platforms. This study utilized the far-right group known as Britain First as an example. According to the study, Britain First previously amassed a following of approximately 1.8 million followers on Facebook. However, when Britain First was banned from Facebook, they relocated to a lesser known platform, Gab, where they have subsequently only garnered a following of approximately 11,181. Taking the results of this study into consideration, it appears that forcing groups like the Islamic State off of mainstream social media platforms would aid significantly in preventing propaganda dissemination and potentially reducing membership of the Islamic State as a result.



However, this solution is frequently critiqued by free speech advocates and those in the intelligence community for a variety of reasons. Among free speech advocates, the concern centers around the divide between expressing a person's personal beliefs and those that have truly been radicalized to violence. Such advocates also generally express support of social media conglomerates not being liable for the individual posts of individual user accounts. Such removal also opens up the possibility of account removal based off of racial and religious biases, as previously warned by Jackson and Prunckun<sup>248 249</sup>. However, even though the First Amendment must be considered when persuading social media platform providers to engage in such as push to remove Islamic State supporting accounts – along with Section 320 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 that states “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” – the United States' government agencies may gain support from Section 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibits the material support to foreign terrorist organizations<sup>250</sup><sup>251</sup>. Uncooperative social media platforms may be determined to be in violation of Section 2339B should the acquisition of user accounts by foreign terrorist organizations, along with any refusal to remove their content, be considered material support by the United States government<sup>252</sup>. Thus, permitting the removal of such accounts without fear of First Amendment violations.

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<sup>248</sup> Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. “Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm.” *Criminal Justice Studies* 20: 111-129

<sup>249</sup> Prunckun, Henry. 2016. “The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism's Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law Enforcement Concern.” *Salus Journal* 4: 62-81

<sup>250</sup> Maras, Marie-Helen. 2017. “Social Media Platforms: Targeting the ‘Found Space’ of Terrorists”. *Journal of Internet Law* 3-9

<sup>251</sup> 2018. “Terrorism and Social Media.” *Congressional Digest* 7-8.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*

Similarly, members of the intelligence community have concerns over the removal of Islamic State supporting user accounts from Twitter and other mainstream social media platforms due to the intelligence value of the information contained on the accounts and the possible ramifications of isolating the group to less popular social media platforms. The user accounts that support the Islamic State on social media platforms offer valuable intelligence information from the propaganda that they distribute. The propaganda postings themselves, although heavily biased, do provide insights to conditions and events within the Islamic State community. They can also provide valuable location information on geotagged posts on location enabled social media accounts, along with member information based off of their networks of friends and followers on the social media websites. While there are potential ramifications to isolating Islamic State supporting users to lesser known social media platforms such as previously mentioned Telegram, RocketChat, and ZeroNet to plan events with more strongly radicalized members, it is an activity that the Islamic State has already been conducting. The Islamic State has already utilized social media platforms like telegram to plan attacks and publish propaganda information for members to distribute amongst their own, individual, social media accounts. Thus, due to the diminished overall presence of Islamic State supporters on social media as a result of their removal from mainstream platforms, the probability that their activity on lesser known platforms would increase or become more radicalized appears to be low.

### **Conclusion**

Hence, it is therefore concluded by this research that counterterrorism efforts by law enforcement agencies in relation to social media platforms should focus on the aforementioned push to remove the Islamic State from mainstream social media platforms in lieu of the failure of counter narratives. The potential combination of user account removal from mainstream social

media platforms and community programs would likely greatly reduce the already small percentage of foreign fighters originating from Western states. It should be noted that such action would likely have minimal impacts on intelligence gathering capabilities or event planning conducted by radicals due to their already implemented use of Telegram and social media platforms that have decentralized data stores. Law enforcement agencies can create designated units to implement intelligence led policing online in order to fight counter radicalization to violence among citizens in their community, like the previously mentioned United Kingdom's Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. Such methods have already been employed on the federal level by the FBI when they captured Hosam Smadi due to his posts on the internet in reference to radicalization to violence and mounting an imminent terrorist attack<sup>253</sup>. Such models could be employed on local levels to increase efficiency and effectiveness.

### **So What? And Final Conclusion**

It is apparent that law enforcement models are needed to acclimate and adapt to international and domestic terrorist threats. It is important to create and support academic literature for all levels of law enforcement whether tribal, local, state, or federal. Similarly, it is important to create and support academic literature for different theatres whether domestic, international, or in cyberspace. Furthermore, it should be noted that cyberspace is possibly the next large war theatre and it is equally important to implement intelligence led policing online by all levels of law enforcement to aid in the prevention of radicalization to violence among citizens in their community.

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<sup>253</sup> FBI. 2010. "Terror Plot Foiled: Inside the Smadi Case."  
<https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/november/terror-plot-foiled>

Furthermore, the United States would likely benefit from a more centralized model of intelligence led policing that bears greater similarities to their Five Eyes Community partners. A possible, more ideal, intelligence led policing model for law enforcement agencies in the United States would place more focus on standardization, training, and funding sources for tribal, local, and state agencies. In this model, a task force composed of geographically representative law enforcement agencies would create a single, uniform definition of intelligence led policing to be utilized by law enforcement agencies across the United States. The federal government would create grant programs that not only seek innovations in countering terrorism but, to bridge resource gaps in agencies that lack the appropriate resources to effectively implement intelligence led policing on the local level. The federal government would also create standardized, easily accessible, training programs containing information on how to utilize fusion centers as well as to train patrol officers in an intelligence capacity, similar to the Phoenix model<sup>254</sup>. Such changes are likely to lead to an increase in effectiveness of intelligence led policing as a countering terrorism method and should be a topic within future research.

In order to bridge the training and resource gap between patrol and fusion centers when implementing intelligence led policing, local law enforcement agencies should adhere to set standardized policies. These policies would bear similarity to the Phoenix model<sup>255</sup>, with some minor alterations. Upon receiving a standardized training program on a state or federal level, local law enforcement agencies should designate one patrol officer per shift, and per district or precinct, to act as intelligence liaison officers. For example, if there are four shifts (alpha, bravo, charlie, and delta) and there are five districts or precincts, then there would be 20 intelligence

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<sup>254</sup> Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. "Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The Phoenix Police Department Intelligence Officer Program." Oxford University Press 12: 332-343

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

liaison officers for the agency. These officers would be the designated users of intelligence databases for each shift and would bridge the information gap with the local fusion centers. Implementing such a policy would allow intelligence liaison officers to relay important intelligence information from their local fusion center to patrol officers, as well as relay local intelligence information from patrol back to the fusion center. Also, due to dual training patrol officers as intelligence liaison officers, it would reduce associated costs of implementing intelligence led policing for local law enforcement agencies as it would eliminate the need for a robust intelligence unit occupied by civilian intelligence analysts.

Moreover, it has been determined by this paper that even though intelligence led policing may become the most effective tool in fighting terrorism, agency implementation of intelligence led policing alone is not a strong enough variable to determine effectiveness. In fact, other variables may have a stronger causal relationship with intelligence led policing and effectiveness, such as budget and employees per capita as touched upon within the first chapter in this paper. This paper is intended to act as a building block for future research in the field of intelligence led policing and countering terrorism.

## **Future Research**

While intelligence led policing as a method on its own appears to be effective as a counter terrorism method, there is a significant lack of research in relation to intelligence led policing, let alone intelligence led policing as it relates to countering terrorism. Other variables to consider for future research would include the number of law enforcement agencies per country, budget, and government involvement in intervention, as well as training programs. Furthermore, intelligence led policing lacks a standardized definition on national and global levels. In future research in academia, researchers may need to determine a single standardized definition of

intelligence led policing. Such standardized definition will not only aid in consistency in academia but, will aid in the effective uniform implementation of intelligence led policing by law enforcement agencies.

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## **Curriculum Vita**

Caitlin Cichoracki is from central Florida and is currently serving as a Sheriff's Deputy in the Volusia County Sheriff's Office. She received her bachelor's degree from Florida Atlantic University in Political Science, with a minor in Sociology, where she was a member of multiple honor societies such as the Political Science Honor Society, Pi Sigma Alpha. Caitlin also received a research grant from the Florida Atlantic University WAVE Program for her research on Daesh propaganda and its effects on American National Security. She also co-authored a published legal review article in the Florida Atlantic University Undergraduate Law Review Journal on international refugees and international law. Caitlin is currently earning her master's degree from Johns Hopkins University in Government, with a concentration in Security Studies. Caitlin found inspiration in her research from witnessing the significant lack of resources and training in intelligence led policing in her own law enforcement agency, along with surrounding agencies in the area.